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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDWARD HAROLD SCHAD, .TR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12485

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of
habeas corpus on February 17, 1971, by the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second
degree on December 11, 1968. Appellant's conviction
for the crime of murder in the second degree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970).
Subsequent to this the appellant's writ of habeas corpus

2

was denied on February 17, 1971, by the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, in a rnemorarnlum decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the
judgment of the lower court denying appellant's writ
of habeas corpus.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
The body of Clare Odell .Mortensen was discovered by his sister. The body was in a closet, nude ( T.
213). A cloth was around the decedent's face tight
enough to be in his mouth ( T. 507). He was bound by
leather thongs and a silk-like cord. The thongs were
tied around the victim's wrist and interwoven between
the silk-like cord Yvhich tied the ankles to the wrists (T.
508) . The back door of the residence was ajar ( T. 206).
According to expert testimony, the cause of the
death of Clare Odell l\Iortensen was the ligature around
his neck which restricted the flow of blood from the
head ·which caused the blood vessels on the brain to
swell and burst ('I'. 512). This was caused by a cloth
tied around his neck tight enough that one would have
difficulty putting his finger urnlerneath it ( T. 508). Dr.
James T. \V eston, the medical examiner who performed
the autopsy, concluded that the purpose of the cloth was

3

to heighten erotic stimulus during an act of sodomy and
that it was placed there by one who assisted in the
erotic act ( T. 75!)) . The time of death was between noon
and 10:00 p.m. July 4, 1968 (T. 513).
Dr. James T. 'V eston also found that there was a
high concentration of acid phosphate within the decedent's rectum as well as within his mouth (T. 520). Acid
phosphate is one of the enzymes present in male semen.
Fecal material was found on the decedent's penis (T.
521).

The night before his death, the victim was seen in
lhe company of the appellant at a nightclub by the victim's mother ( T. 190) . Another witness, Sandra Twitchell, noticed tbe Yictim and the appellant enter the
nightclub together and she observed the victim invite
the appellant to go home with him, to which the appellant
refused ( T. 392). At about 6 :00 a.m. on the 4th of July,
the appellant was again with the decedent, at the dececlent' s apartment ( T. 631). The appellant testified
that after 12 :30 p.m. on the 4th of July he never saw
the decedent again ( T. 626).
On July 4, 1968, at about 2 :00 p.m. the decedent
and the appellant were seen by the bartender at The
Lounge (T. 7'75). They left together at about 4:00 p.m.
(T. 776). No other witness was found who saw them
iogether that afternoon.
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On the night of the murder, the appellant met Sandra Twitchell at the Roundup at about 8:30 p.m. The
appellant told her that he wanted to move into a motel
and that the decedent had flown to Seattle ( T. 395).
Appellant also told this witness that the victim was
"kind of queer" and that appellant had busted him (T.
396). She testified that the appellant seemed much more
shaky or nervous than before ( T. 398) .
A neighbor to the decedent testified that she had
talked with appellant outside the decedent's home at
9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T. 285). Appellant told this lady
that his friend (the decedent) had been called unexpectedly out of town ( T. 286) .
Another neighbor testified that he had seen the
appellant replace a screen on a window in decedent's
apartrrent on the day after the killing (T. 310). Appellant himself testified that he picked up his belongings
(T. 641).
The evidence at the trial showed that the silk-like
cord used to tie the decedent's wrists and ankles was a
lace from combat boots (T. 482). The manager of the
motel where appellant stayed observed appellant's combat boots and testified that they were lacking laces
(T. 345).
The appellant moved to a motel and discarded cer-
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tain items of the decedent's personal property (including
decedent's wallet) in a trash barrel at the motel (T.
350). The defendant then used the decedent's Walker
Bankard to obtain money for an airline ticket to Germany. The appellant was arrested by the military authorities in Germany (T. 440).
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second
degree on December 11, 1968. Appellant's conviction
for the crime of murder in the second degree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 ( 1970).
Subsequent to this the appellant's writ of habeas corpus
was denied on February 17, 1971 by the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, in a memorandum decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT
SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED BY THIS
COURT BECAUSE THI~Y DO NOT PRESENT
PROPER ISSUES FOR A HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDING.
A

THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT
CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD NOT BE
REVIE\VED AS IT PRESENTS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAl\lE ISSUE RAISED ON
APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL APPEAL FROM
HIS CONVICTION.
Point A of Appellant's Argument raises the issue of the legality of the search and seizure of his suit
cases and the items contained therein. It is argued that
this resulted in prejudicial error requiring reversal.
This presents substantially the same issue raised by appellant and ruled on by this court in his original appeal
from his conviction. State of Utah v. Schad, 24 Utah
2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970) at 248, 249. Therefore,
appellant is using this appeal from the denial of a writ
of habeas corpus to provide him with another review of
the same issue raised during the original appeal. This
is not the purpose of habeas corpus.
The same conclusion that respondent urges was expressed in Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d
121 ( 1967). Bryant involved a writ of habeas corpus
which followed a conviction for second degree murder.
No appeal was taken from this conviction. The Court
in Bryant reasoned that the purpose of habeas corpus
"is not to review a final judgment arrived at through
regular proceedings and due process of law by a court
having jurisdiction." Id. at 122. The court said further
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that to turn habeas corpus into an appellate review
"should not be done nor countenanced in our procedure .... " Id. at 122.
An important decision that is even more germane
to the case at bar is Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126,
434 P .2d 305 ( 1967) . In Sinclair substantially the same
issues complained of in the appeal from the denial of a
writ of habeas corpus were raised and ruled upon in the
appeal from her conviction. The court stated the following:
"We took occasion to explain in the recent case of Bryant v. Turner, that it is not a
proper purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding to provide another review of the same issues that have been previously adjudicated on
a regular appeal." Id. at 308.
An identical holding was recently handed down in Scandrett v. Turner, ____ Utah 2d.... , 489 P.2d 1186 (1971).
The court held that a writ of habeas corpus may not be
used to relitigate issues that had been previously litigated in a regular appeal. The court used this as the
basis for affirming the trial court's denial of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The same problem is presented in the case at bar.
During the original appeal from his conviction the appellant raised the issue of the legality of the search and
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seizure. State v. Schad, supra, at 247. The court in Schad
ruled on this issue by holding that the admission of the
evidence seized could not be regarded as reversible error.
State v. Schad, supra, at 249. In the case at bar, the appellant is using the appeal from the denial of his writ
of habeas corpus to relitigate this issue. Under the authority of Sinclair v. Turner, supra, and Scandrett v.
Turner, supra, habeas corpus may not be used for this
purpose and this Court in the case at bar should again
follow this precedent.
B
THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT,
WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT INQUIRIES :MADE BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR, SHOULD NOT BE REVIE\VED BY TIIIS COURT AS IT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN RAISED BY REGULAR APPEAL.
The principle reason why this issue is not proper
for consideration in this appeal from the denial of a
writ of habeas corpus is that the appellant, in arguing
this issue, is attempting to turn the habeas corpus proceeding into an appellate review. The al1eged irregularity was known or should have been known to the appel-
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lant at the time of judgment or during the time permitte<l for regular appellate review. This being so, the
issue should have been raised by the regular appeal
process. Case law in Utah has consistently supported
this proposition.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Brown v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 96, 440 P .2d 968 ( 1968), discussed a number
of limitations on habeas corpus proceedings. In Bro't.on,
after emphasizing that habeas corpus cannot properly
be treated as a regular appellate review, the Court
stated:
"If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the
party at the time the judgment was entered,
it must be reviewed in the manner and within
the time permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment becomes final and
is not subject to further attack. ... " Id. at 969.
The Brown decision pointed out that there are only a
few unusual circumstances when the court will review
an issue in a habeas corpus proceeding that could have
been raised on appeal. Id. at 969. The first is lack of
jurisdiction, which is not applicable to the case at bar.
The second is where the party is substantially and effectively denied due process of law. It is not alleged that
this questioning has substantially denied the appellant
due proeess of law. The third is that some fact has been
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shown that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction. This issue does not demonstrate such outrageous prejudice so that it could be considered unconscionable not to review it. Indeed, the issue raises
no prejudice to the appellant at all, as is demonstrated
by Point II of Respondent's Brief. The issue clearly
does not fall within one of the "unusual circumstances"
given in Brown, and therefore should have been raised
by regular appeal. See also ltliller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d
30 l (10th Cir. 1965) .
The principles discussed in Brown v. Turner, supra,
were also considered in Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d
229, 443 P .2d 1020 ( 1968). Velasquez concerned a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for release of a juvenile
from the Industrial School. The court's reasoning relevant to the case at bar is as follows:
"As to any claimed error or irregularity
which was known or should have been known
to the appellant at the time of judgment,
there was first an obligation to call it to the trial
court's attention and seek remedy; and that
failing, there was next a duty to seek review
and correction on appeal. If this is not done
within the time allowed by law, the judgment
becomes final and not subject to further attack for any matters which could have been so
reviewed on regular appeal." Id. at 1022 (Emphasis supplied).
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The alleged irregularity raised by appellant falls
within the scope of Brown v. Turner, supra, and Velasquez v. Pratt, supra. The issue is one that was known
or should have been known to the appellant in time for
it to be argued by regular appeal. Also, the issue fails
to fall within the "unusual circumstances" outlined in
Brown. Therefore, the issue is not a proper issue for
review in a habeas corpus proceeding.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S CROSSEXA~1IN ATION OF THE APPELLANT CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS 'VAS NOT IMPROPER OR PREJUDICIAL.
Notwithstanding that this issue should have been
raised during appellant's regular appeal, the alleged
improper inquiries will be discussed in order to demonstrate that the inquiries did not prejudice the appellant
nor were they improper.
The appellant contends that there were three instances where the cross-examination by the district attorney exceeded permissible examination. The first is
the questioning concerning the appellant's discharge
from the service ( T. 545) . Appellant alleges this questioning was neither probative nor relevant. It is difficult
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t0 contend this questioning was prejudicial smce the
appellant \ms being cross-examined, which places the
credibility as a witness in issue. The appellant was asked
what type of discharge he received from the service and
he replied that he did not know ( T. 545). This could
hardly be deemed prejudicial or improper.
The second alleged instance of improper questionmg was when appellant was asked the time and place
of his prior felony convictions ( T. 545, 546, 547). This
type of questioning is clearly permissible in Utah. See
State v. Kazda, infra. and State v. Younglove, infra.
The third allegation concerns questioning about
the illegal wearing of a United States Army uniform
( T. 547, 548) . This questioning could not be considered
prejudicial nor is it a basis for appeal. This question~ng included the question of whether the appellant had
been convicted of a felony for illegally wearing a United
States .fumy uniform. An objection was raised by defense counsel charging that this was not a felony and
was irrelevant. The trial court sustained the objection
granting remedy to the defense and preventing error
( T. 548). Appellant cannot now claim error when he
was granted a remedy at trial by the court sustaining
his objection. In Velasques v. Pratt, supra, the Court
discusses the procedure for redressing claimed error.
The opinion says that there is first an obligation to call
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an error to the trial court's attention and seek remedy,
443 P.2d at 1022. In the case at bar, defense counsel
met this obligation. Velasquez goes on to say:
" ... that failing, there was next a duty to seek review
and correction on appeal." 443 P.2d at 1022 (Emphasis
added). In the instant case the attempt to seek a remedy
did not fail since the objection was sustained, and therefore, there is nothing to correct on appeal. It is clear
that this line of questioning was not allowed to advanre
to the point of being improper or prejudicial.
The second alleged improper questioning concerning prior felonies deserves further discussion. The scope
of this questioning included questioning as to whether
the appellant had been convicted of a felony, the number of felony convictions, when and where they were
committed, and what those felonies were. This scope
of questioning is permissible under Utah case law. Moreover, this questioning is authorized by statute.
Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-9 ( 1953), requires that
a witness must, among other things, " ... answer as to
the fact of his previous conviction of felony." This type
of questioning has been developed by judicial decision.
In State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407
( 1963) , the court was confronted with an allegation of
error because of the cross-examination of the defendant
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as to prior convictions. The court discharged this allegation by saying:
"'Vhen an accused voluntarily takes the
witness stand he may be asked whether or not
he has ever been convicted of a felony . . . .
If the accused answers in the affirmative, he
may ask the nature of the felony. Further, the
accused may be asked if he has been convicted
of more than one felony, and if so, the type
and nature thereof." Id. at 409.
The questioning in the case at bar falls within the permissible limits of questioning outlined in Kazda.
In a more recent decision the Court was again confronting this issue. State v. Younglove, 17 Utah 2d 268,
409 P.2d 125 ( 1965). In this case the defendant, in a
bastardy action, took the witness stand in his own defense. On cross-examination the trial court required him
to respond to questions relating to ·what his prior felony
was and when it was committed, among other things, Id.
at 126. The court did not hold that these questions went
beyond the permissible scope of questioning. So it is in
the case at bar; the questioning by the district attorney
simply asked the permissible what, where, and when
about prior felonies which is not improper or prejudicial.
The questioning did not venture into the area of improper questioning which are questions that seek "details
or circumstances" of the felony. See discussion in State
v. Younglove, supra, at 126.

15

It is important to understand the reason for allowing such questions about a witness's prior felony convictions. In State v. Kazda, supra, the court said that its
purpose was to affect his credibility as a witness. 382
P.2d 409. In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d
412 ( 1961), a case cited by appellant in support of his
position, the court again said that the purpose of allowing questioning as to prior felony convictions is to allow
a witness's credibility to be impeached. 361 P.2d at 413.

The appellant cites Dickson and quotes from the
opinion in an attempt to show that this evidence of prior
felonies should have been excluded as it is an attempt
to show a bad reputation and relying on that for conviction (Appellant's Brief at 14) . A closer analysis of this
case is needed in order to fully understand its meaning
and significance. Dickson stands for the proposition
that the previously defined limits of questioning about
prior felony convictions is a valid use of cross-examination. 361 P.2d at 413. But, in Dickson, "the prosecutor
pressed beyond that." Id. at 413. The Court did hold
the purpose of certain questioning to be the showing of
a bad reputation and casting aspersions on the defendant, but this particular questioning was not about a prior
felony conviction.
Rather it was about a crime that the defendant had
only been charged with. Id. at 414. The questioning
in the case at bar was whether the appellant had been
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convicted of a felony, not charged with a crime. The
only questioning that could possibly relate to Dickson
was that concerning the illegal wearing of a United
States Army Uniform, which, of course, was not admitted due to the trial court's sustaining of the defense's
objection.
The questioning that is alleged by appellant to be
improper and prejudicial is clearly proper under both
statute and judicial decisions. _Moreover, if the questioning could possibly be considered improper by any line
of reasoning, it could not be deemed of such significance
as to result in substantial injustice. vVhether justice was
done and guilt established is the determination that must
be made in habeas corpus proceedings. Brown v. Turner, supra, at 969, 970. In the case at bar substantial
justice was clearly the end product of the trial. Further, if the questioning were considered error, it could
not be considered substantial error. In Alires v. Turner_
22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P .2d 241 ( 1969), a case wherein
a writ of habeas corpus was granted, the Utah Supreme
Court expressed the policy of our law. The Court declared:
" ... it is the policy of our law, established
both by statute and decision, that we do not
reverse for mere error or irregularity, but only
where it is substantial and prejudicial. That
is, not unless the error is of sufficient import-
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ance that it might have had some effect upon
the result." Id. at 242.
It can be concluded that the alleged improper questioning was not improper or prejudicial and therefore
it cannot be the basis for granting a writ of habeas
corpus.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the trial court's denial of
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed by
this court. The first issue raised by appellant, concerning an alleged illegal search and seizure, is substantially
the same issue raised by appellant on his original appeal
from his conviction. This attempt to relitigate issues
already ruled upon by this court should not be countenenced in our procedure. This position is fully supported
by case law in Utah. Similarly, the second issue raised
by appellant, concerning alleged improper questioning
by the district attorney, should not be reviewed by the
court as it should have been raised on regular appeal
Appellant is attempting to turn the time-honored procedure of habeas corpus into another appellate review.
Again, case law in Utah rejects this use of the habeas
corpus procedure. Further, the inquiries made by the
district attorney, that appellant alleges were improper,
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are not improper nor did they prejudice the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. RO.MNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

Attorneys for Respondent

